While past studies had conflicting conclusions regarding the impact of foreign aid on growth and development of a nation, recent studies have tried to delve deeper into the question, 'what makes aid work? '(see, Dutta, Leeson and Williamson, 2012; Burnside and Dollar, 2004 ; 2000; Svesson, 1999). This paper tests how political stability (vis-à-vis political instability) affects the relationship between domestic investment and foreign aid. Applying dynamic panel estimators, our results show that political stability affects aid's effectiveness on domestic capital formation. The paper considers alternative measures of political stability (vis-à-vis instability), focusing on the political characteristics of a system that have the potential to make a nation stable. Political stability affects policy selection by the government positively and, thus, public resources like foreign aid are put to the desired use. The estimated marginal impacts show that foreign aid enhances domestic investment in the presence of a stable political climate, but there is a diminishing return to aid.
Introduction
Aid is criticized for not contributing to economic development and gross capital formation.
Following the recent literature, we explore what makes aid effective or ineffective? We begin with an introductory anecdote of two countries from the same region exhibiting a stark difference in the impact of aid. First, we turn our attention to Tanzania. Tanzania is growing at the rate of almost 7% for the last 10 years and is expected to reach middle income status by 2025. Foreign aid (USD-1.6 billion in recent years: http://www.aideffectiveness.org/Country-Tanzania.html ) in Tanzania, when compared to the rest of Africa, has been mostly successful due to several conducive factors, such as a stable political system. The political stability in Tanzania has encouraged foreign donors to allocate a greater portion of aid to Tanzania. Additionally, a stable political environment ensures that corruption associated with foreign aid in Tanzania sources. Yet aid has been ineffective to help Haiti overcome its precarious economic condition.
Haiti is a country that has faced several instances of political instability due to its inherent constitutional weakness and the unsustainable nature of the political system. Haiti was ruled by a repressive dictator from 1957 to 1971, only to be replaced by a military dictatorship in the eighties. Since then there have been several cases of the government being overthrown resulting in a continuing unstable environment. Overall, Haiti's situation has been extremely vulnerable with no functioning parliament or judiciary system, no political consensus and the presence of extreme violence. (http://www.napawash.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/06-04.pdf).
The above anecdotes indicate that inflow of aid alone is no panacea for the least developing nations' problems. In fact, the impact of aid could be strikingly different based on the internal environment of the recipient country. In this context, domestic institutional factors play a critical role. Burnside and Dollar (2000) concluded that "aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies, but has little effect in the presence of poor policies." Weak institutions result in weak governance, and the personal interests of public officials overrides the collective interests rendering the state powerless to implement the necessary reforms.
Recent strand in the foreign aid literature show that effectiveness of aid may be conditioned to features of the recipient countries. Below we summarize the recent findings that reported interaction between aid and some policy variables:
Research Study
Publication Year Time period Interaction Term Burnside and Dollar 2000 1970 Foreign Aid x Policy Index Collier & Dehn 2001 1974 Foreign Aid x Policy Index Guillamont & Chauvet 2002 1970 Foreign Aid x Environment Collier and Hoffler 2002 1974 -1997 Foreign Aid x post-conflict Burnside and Dollar 2004 1970 Foreign Aid x Institutional Quality Following these strand of literature, in this paper we analyze how the presence of various forms of political stability or instability affects aid's impact on domestic capital formation and, thus, domestic investment. Our definition of political instability encompasses regime type and several characteristics of a political regime. Factors such as regime type (for example military or an elective regime), nature of the head of state (military, elective or others), process of legislative selection, and presence of uncertainty in the top authority (reflected through many forced changes), are considered as measures of political stability (instability). Existing studies discuss political instability being reflected in the traits of the political regime of a nation. As pointed out by Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) , in politically unstable and polarized environments, the probability of inefficient and sub-optimal policy adoption by the government is significantly high. Such environments are very common in more centralized regimes where both executive and legislative bodies have been selected through less competitive process. Governments under a politically unstable environment are more likely to select inefficient tax systems, are more likely to have higher consumption and are more likely to accumulate higher external debt (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2005) . Thus, public resources like aid will not be put to its right use and can even be diverted for private use.
In addition, the quality of democracy and the tenure of a political system are also considered as alternate measures. The tenure (or term) of a democratic system is important since as mentioned by Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson (1996) , 'short-term perspectives are not likely to help policy makers keep their commitments'. Thus, the other set of measures include the quality of political institutions and tenure of a political system.
We consider a panel of 120 countries over 30 years (1979 -2008) impact on domestic investment. Our paper contributes to the literature that stresses on the impact of aid being conditional on the institutional environment of a nation Dollar 2004, 2000; Svensson, 1999) .
Next section describes the foreign aid and growth model. Section 3 discusses the data and the sources. Section 4 talks about the methodology and the benchmark results. Section 5 discusses robustness analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
Saving and Foreign Aid Model
The development literature has expressed skepticism about the impact of foreign aid inflows on growth and development of the recipient nations (see Arndt et al. 2010, Doucouliagos and Paldam 2008; Smith 2008; Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2008; Rajan and Subramanian 2007; Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2004; Roodman 2004; Bräutigam and Knack 2004 ). Yet, it is hard to deny that such capital inflows are critical needs for the developing world given the resource constraints they face. The aid-financed investment theory based on models like Harrod-Domar (Harrod 1948; Domar 1946 ) and the Two-Gap Model stressed the need for capital inflows for the developing world since they are resource constrained and thus cannot finance investment through their savings. We present a version of the model below that describes the needs of foreign capital to mitigate the saving-investment gap of developing nations. Further, it delineates the conditions under which the impact of aid on domestic investment changes.
Two-Gap Model:
Formally in a closed economy Harrod-Domar model, the investment ratio=savings ratio,
where it is investment as a proportion of GDP, and st is the saving as a proportion of GDP.
For an open economy, foreign aid ( ) is included so that,
Therefore, marginal effect of aid on investment is as follows:
The extant literature establishes that savings ratio includes marginal rate of savings and a component that is a proportion of foreign aid
where 0 represents the marginal rate of savings and 1 the impact aid inflows has on savings. Hence,
Therefore,
From equation 6, it is clear that the effect of aid on investment depends on the value of 1 .
(1) If 1 > 1, then foreign aid will increase domestic savings and domestic investment (2) If 1 = 1, then all aid goes to investment (3) Next there is the possibility that 0 < 1 < 1. This is a case where the overall impact is still positive but foreign aid crowds out some domestic savings and investment. There are two more extreme possibilities.
(4) If 1 < 0, then foreign aid actually reduces domestic saving and investment and hinders economic growth.
(5) If 1 = −1, then aid has a zero effect on investment. In this case all aid is consumed and none is invested.
From the perspective of policymakers in the developing world, it is important to understand the factors that can attribute to the different values of 1 as mentioned above. How can political stability affect 1 ? Our paper seeks answer to this question.
Data and its Sources
Our data comes from various sources as explained in detail below.
Dependent Variables
Based on the hypothesis, we investigate the impact of aid inflows on domestic investment. We use gross capital formation (GCF) as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) as the proxy for domestic investment. The data comes from the World Development Indicators (WDI), 2010
database. According to World Bank definition, gross capital formation (formerly termed gross domestic investment in the WDI database) consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets 2 of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. As can be seen in Appendix 1, the mean of our sample is fairly high -23 percent of GDP, but at the same time, the capital flows are highly volatile (standard deviation = 7.8). The mean is lower for the Sub-Saharan African (SSA)
countries -20 percent of GDP, but the standard deviation is higher than our main sample (8.7).
Independent Varaibles
Our main independent variable of interest is foreign aid inflow to a nation. 
Other Control Variables
We consider a wide range of controls that can be potential determinants of domestic investment.
As a proxy of market size, we consider GDP per capita. In terms of gross capital formation, GDP per capita will be indicative of how much resources can be channelized into savings and thus, into domestic investment and also of overall development of a country. A stable macroeconomic policy is critical for the growth and development of a nation (see, Busse and Hefeker 2007) . As Fischer (1993) and Ndikumana (2000) point out, inflation is an efficient indicator of how well the government manages the economy and high rates of inflation essentially means that 'government has lost control of the economy' and is indicative of greater uncertainty. Thus, we control for inflation in our specifications. Among policy-related factors, government consumption has the potential to crowd out domestic investment through multiple channels -by raising interest rates, by lowering the pool of funds available in the markets, and by raising distortionary taxes on investment (Ndikumana 2000) . Further, Ndikumana points out that similar to private borrowers, government can default on their own loans, which, in turn, makes the financial system fragile and depresses investment further. Thus, we control for government consumption expenditure in our specifications.
Based on neo-classical theory, interest rates should have a negative relationship with domestic investment. Increase in the rate of interest increases the cost of capital and thus, reduces investment (Jorgenson 1963; Haavelmo 1960 We have an extensive sample of 120 countries over a period of 1979 to 2008. We consider 5-year averages for our estimation model. Income and Low Income groups. Almost 30 percent of the countries in the sample belong to the Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) region. Appendix 2B lists all the variables used in the paper.
3 Democracy is one our variables for measuring political stability 4 We follow World Bank classification
Empirical Model and Benchmark Results

Empirical Model
For our benchmark specifications we consider dynamic panel estimators. As mentioned by Roodman (2006) and Bond (2002) , the dynamic panel estimators are designed for short, wide ( N > T) linear panels that involve a single dependent variable, are subject to fixed country effects and suffer from serial correlation and heteroscedasticity among error terms. The fixed effects are eliminated in Difference GMM estimators by first differencing the data. The dynamic panel estimators also take care of possible endogeneity 5 concern with respect to independent variables of interest. System GMM, in some sense, improves on the Difference GMM estimator by estimating the model in both difference and levels and generating a separate set of instruments for each equation (Roodman, 2006) . So, for our benchmark model, we consider System GMM specifications. As part of robustness analysis, we also check our results with Difference GMM Our baseline empirical specification is as follows I it = α 0 + α 1 I it−1 + α 2 I it−2 + α 3 Aid it + α 4 Aid it 2 + α 5 X it + α 6 Z t + α 7 R í + ϵ it
(1) 5 The aid literature has strongly stressed the presence of reverse causality for any regression with aid as the explanatory variables (see, for instance, Dutta, Leeson and Williamson 2012; Dollar 2001, 2004; Easterly et al 2004; Djankov et.al 2008) . Endogeneity concerns can be addressed with an instrumental variable approach. The challenge is that we need to find instruments which are truly exogenous in nature, i.e they are uncorrelated with the error term. Even though IV estimates are consistent, Murray (2006) mention that IV estimates suffer from inherent bias and problematic finite sample properties. As Baum points out that in the presence of weak instruments, IV instruments may not be an improvement over OLS estimators. The dynamic panel estimators are well-suited to handle fixed effects and endogeneity of regressors and, further, they are designed to avoid dynamic panel bias ( Nickell, 1981) .
where I it is domestic investment, for country i in period t, as a percentage of GDP. As mentioned in Section 2.1, we consider gross capital formation (GCF) as proxy for domestic investment. We consider two lagged values of GCF to take into account serial correlation. Aid it is inflow of foreign aid for country i in period t, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Aid it 2 takes into account the potential non-linear impact of aid on investment. Studies ( Our benchmark specification is as follows I it = α 0 + α 1 I it−1 + α 2 I it−2 + α 3 Aid it + α 4 Aid it 2 + α 5 (Aid * PI) it + α 6 PS it + α 7 X it + α 8 R í + α 9 Z t + ϵ it (2) where (Aid * PI) is our variable of interest. PI it implies a particular measure of political instability for country i in period t. As mentioned before, we consider various measures of political instability. The marginal impact of aid will be given by
is determined by the signs of 3 , 4 , 5 and magnitude of PI. Based on previous literature that has stated that aid impacts investment positively but at a diminishing rate, we can expect 3 > 0 and 4 < 0. 5 can be < 0 or > 0. In terms of the marginal 7 impact of aid, we can have the following possibilities i. 
Baseline Results
Table 1 presents our baseline results. We re-explore the association between aid and domestic investments based on equation (1). We report the results for fixed effect estimators, and both System and Difference GMM estimators. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results for the three models respectively. As evident from the tables, aid has a significant non-linear impact on GCF. Aid boosts investment at a diminishing rate. Thus, as suggested by Lensink and White (1999) and Hansen and Tarp (2000) , we find a Laffer curve effect with respect to aid. We estimate the marginal impact of aid at the mean, median and other quantile values of aid for our 7 At the same time, it is possible to define a threshold level of PI, the level at which aid has no impact on domestic investment. It will be given by * = ( 3 +2 4 ) 5 sample. For the fixed effect estimates, at the mean value of aid (7.3, see Appendix 1), the impact of aid is positive and significant and equal to 0.27. Yet, at the first quantile or the 25 th percentile value of aid (= 0.91), the impact of aid is much stronger and equal to 0.42. Thus, the estimated marginal effects provide evidence of diminishing return to aid. At the median value of aid ( = 4.11), the impact of aid on domestic investment is stronger than at the mean value of aid ( = 0.34). For very high values of aid (at the 95 th percentile, aid = 24.001), the impact of aid becomes negative but it is insignificant. Previous literature has stated that too much diversion of resources for aid management can imply failure of institutions related to government functioning and, hence, the effect of aid can be negative. But for our sample, this is true for only 5% of the sample and the effect is not significant.
In terms of the controls, the coefficient of democracy is positive and significant for all the specifications implying that democracy affects investment positively. Trade openness has a positive impact on investment for fixed effect and System GMM estimates, but loses its significance for the Difference GMM estimates. Inflation seems to have a concave association with domestic investment but the coefficient of the linear term is not significant. Government consumption affects domestic investment negatively and the impact is significant for most of the specifications. Finally, both trade and interest rate have a positive impact on domestic investment.
Benchmark Results
As part of our benchmark results, we test the question we are mainly interested in. We test the specification in equation (2). Table 3 ).
For 50% of the sample, there are no instances of Coups d'Etat over the sample period and, thus, it signals a politically stable situation. For such countries, we find that the impact of aid to be significant and positive. Yet, for some countries, there are a few instances of forced changes in the government and, accordingly, we see a fall in aid effectiveness. For 10% of our sample, the value of Coups d'état is equal to 1 signifying a higher degree of political instability, and we find the effect of aid to be negative. Yet, the impact of aid is not significant. Similarly, in the case of the head of state, most countries have a president as the head of the state and aid's impact with regard to domestic investment is positive. The impact of aid diminishes for countries that do not have a president as the head of the state.
Finally, most countries have an elected legislature and in the presence of such a legislature, the impact of aid on domestic investment is positive. Almost 75% of our sample has such a scenario. In the case of a non-elected legislature, we find aid's impact to be relatively smaller but the impact is not significant. Overall our findings suggest that a politically stable situation in terms of fewer propensities of a change in the executive of a country enhances its aid effectiveness. Thus, political stability in terms of a stable constitution with an elected legislature, with no or minimal involvement of military enhances aid effectiveness with regard to its impact on domestic investment. Conversely, politically unstable situation makes aid less effective although for our sample, the impact is hardly significant.
Results with alternative measures of political stability
In Table 4 , we consider alternate measures of political stability. Although the literature does not conclusively establish a correlation between democracy and growth, studies have pointed to a beneficial impact of democracy in terms of reducing political instability. Alesina and Perotti (1996) consider regime type as one of the measures of political stability. Further, Blanco and
Grier (2009) also show that democratic countries are prone to experience more political stability.
Thus, we consider the quality of political institutions, extent of democracy, as an alternate measure of political stability. Our first measure of democracy is considered from the Polity IV database that is included as a control in our benchmark specifications. An alternate measure of democracy is considered from Freedom House database. The tenure of a political system (how long a country has remained democratic) is critical along with the strength of a democratic system. Thus, along with considering the quality of political institutions, we also consider the tenure of a political system. We include TENSYS from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI). TENSYS is based on the Elective Indices of the Electoral Competitiveness 8 (EIEC) score.
If EIEC is below 6, then a country is considered autocratic. If EIEC equals 6 or 7, then TENSYS considers how long the country had this situation. The value is then incremented each subsequent year that EIEC stays 6 or 7. While column (1) of Table 4 presents the results for the Polity IV measure of democracy, column (4) considers the Freedom House measure of democracy.
Column (2) presents the results by considering TENSYS as a measure and in column (3), we test the results with TENSYS along with controlling for democracy. For all the columns, the coefficient of (Aid * PI) is positive and significant. While the coefficient of 2 is negative and significant for all the alternate specifications, that of is not significant but remains positive throughout. Most of the controls retain their sign and significance,
In Table 4A , we present the estimated marginal impacts. Column (1) present the results for the measure of Democracy from Polity IV database, Column (2) present the results for TENSYS, Column (3) present the results for TENSYS when we control for Democracy and finally column (4) present the results for Democracy measure from Freedom House database. As we can see, in the case of column (1) estimates, aid becomes effective only for a high level of democracy -otherwise although, the effect is positive, it is not significant. But in the case of TENSYS, the duration of a political regime, the positive impact of aid is experienced by the top 50% of the sample. With the matured democracy in place, the impact of aid on gross capital formation becomes stronger. However, as we can see from Column (3), when we control for democracy while considering TENSYS as a measure of political instability, the marginal impacts become significant for greater percentage of our sample. But, the overall conclusion is the same -a country with a matured democracy experience greater positive impact of aid on gross capital formation. For the democracy measure from Freedom House, the impact of aid is more significant compared to the marginal impacts for the Polity IV measure. Interestingly, the marginal impact of aid never becomes negative for these alternate sets of measures. Yet, as evident from the percentiles, our sample of countries is more skewed towards being more democratic than autocratic.
Robustness Analysis
Difference GMM Results
Our robustness analysis includes checking our results with alternate model specifications, estimating the impact of aid at different levels of aid and with sub-sample of countries. We first rerun our benchmark specifications by considering Difference GMM estimators. The literature has stated that System GMM estimators are better compared to Difference GMM estimators in terms of reduced bias and precision. However, according to Hahn and Hausman (2002) , the System GMM estimator utilizes more instruments, and thus raises worries about the estimates being heavily biased. Hence, we check our results with Difference GMM estimators as well. We first check our results for our benchmark measures of political instability. 9 The coefficient of the interaction term,(Aid * PI), retains its sign and significance for all the specifications. While the coefficient of Aid 2 is negative and significant for all the specifications, the coefficient of Aid loses its significance for some of the specifications. The estimated marginal impacts based on the difference GMM estimates also provide us with similar conclusions. For all the different measures, for a politically stable situation, aid's impact on domestic capital formation remains positive and significant for our sample. There are some minor differences however, compared to System GMM results. For example, in the case of legislative selection, the impact of aid remains positive and significant throughout even in the case of a non-elective legislature. But the impact of aid becomes stronger when the country has an elected legislature. Overall, our conclusions remain unaltered.
We further check our results for the alternative measures of political instability -democracy and tenure of a democratic system -with Difference GMM estimates. 10 In this case, the interaction terms for the democracy measures loses their significance. Though the coefficient for the Polity IV measure is weakly significant, that of the Freedom House measure is not significant at all. The interaction term for the TENSYS measure is positive and significant. In conclusion marginal impacts for the Difference GMM estimates remain qualitatively similar for the alternate measures.
Estimating the impact of aid at different levels of aid and political stability
So far, we have calculated the marginal impact of aid at various levels of political instability, by considering the mean value of aid. Yet, based on previous findings and our baseline results, the impact of aid is actually non-linear. Hence we check the non-linear impact of aid on domestic investment for different values of political instability and at three different percentiles of foreign aid, instead of considering the mean only. Our aim is to check whether non-linearity of aid exists at the different levels of political stability (vis-à-vis political instability). We consider the estimates from our benchmark specification. Due to space constraints, we present the results 11 for type of regime and legislative selection in 
Checking with sub-samples
Finally, we check our results with different sub-samples of countries. Our estimators take into account time invariant country characteristics. Yet, groups of countries from our sample may have experienced specific development trajectory or may have similar institutional structure.
Therefore, it is worth checking our results with sub-samples of countries. First, we check our results with countries that have been classified as the low income and low middle-income countries. These countries, as expected, have received more than aid than the upper middleincome or high income countries and, thus, the implication of the findings will be more applicable to such countries. Keeping the space constraint in mind, we present the results with the benchmark results of political stability in Table 6 . We also run the results with the alternate measures of political stability. We present these results in Appendix 4. The sign and significance of the coefficients of our variables of interest is retained for the sub-sample of countries. The coefficients of Aid and Aid 2 are positive and negative respectively for almost all the specifications. The coefficient of the interaction term, Aid*PI is also of expected sign and significance. We do not report the marginal effects for these results keeping the space constraint in mind. They are available on request. Our estimated marginal effects support our benchmark findings. Aid's effectiveness on domestic investment declines for politically unstable situations.
The literature focusing on institutions and economic development has stressed the role of colonization as a determinant factor for current development of countries. The pioneering work of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) explains in this context how settlement of strategies of colonizers determined the evolution of early institution, which, in turn, affected present institutions and, thus, current economic performance. In addition, many of these countries received more aid with democratization as a condition for continued assistance. Thus, we check our results with a sub-sample of ex-colonies. In Table 7 , we present the results. The results are presented for the benchmark measures of political stability as well as for the alternate measures.
Our results are robust. The coefficients retain their sign and significance. The results suggest that greater political stability enhances aid effectiveness. This is true for all measures of political stability except in the case of Coups d'État where we lose the significance of the interaction term but the sign remains negative. Again, we do not report the marginal impacts but they are available on request. The estimated marginal impacts give us similar conclusion. With a stable political climate, be it in the form of an elected representative of state, an elected legislature, a stable democracy or a democracy with a longer tenure, aid effectiveness increases. Apart from Coups d'État, the marginal impacts are significant for most of the other measures of political stability.
Summary and Policy Implications
The recent aid literature has shifted its focus to 'what makes aid work'. Following this trend of literature, we test the impact of aid on capital accumulation of a nation and the role of political stability in affecting aid effectiveness. To handle panel data challenges, we employ dynamic panel estimators. Our results show that political stability indeed affects aid effectiveness. We find that in the presence of a stable political system in the form of a stable constitution with an elected legislature and no or minimal involvement of military, aid is effective in raising domestic investment. For our sample of countries that are mostly politically stable, aid effectiveness is found to be positive. Yet, politically unstable situations make aid less effective although for our sample, the impact is hardly significant. Further, we find evidence that there is diminishing return with respect to aid, at all levels of political stability.
Policy Implications
Our findings on aid's conditional impact are striking. The findings suggest that foreign aid, contributes to economic growth by increasing domestic investment. This study also assesses the degree to which the political stability in a recipient country influences foreign aid's effectiveness.
It is important to begin by discussing why the political stability is likely to have an impact on how effectively aid is used. Bourguignon and Platteau (2012) point out that the fact that those countries which are most in need of aid are often those with the worst governance levels. This puts donors in a serious dilemma. Because the poorest people tend precisely to live in badly governed countries (in particular, those where the state has failed) therefore denying them the benefits of foreign aid would defy the purpose of providing aids.
Our results indicate the need to include conditionality to strengthen good governance in developing countries as a part of aid based development assistance. In particular aid should embed the 'pacts for governance reform' that must enshrine the shared political objectives as well as reciprocal obligations of both donors and recipient countries. It is further to be recognized that in particular adverse circumstances where owing to embezzlement or mismanagement of the elite from the recipient countries, aid is most likely to become ineffective.
Under such extreme circumstances, a democratic conditionality may also be applied. Official aid should be postponed or suspended to prevent autocratic regimes to divert use of these finds into completely unintended purposes. However, it is also worth mentioning that attachment of conditionality may also undermine the domestic democratic processes by supplanting public policy-making as warned by Collier (1993) .
Majority of countries in our sample with a stable political framework are democratic countries. Does democratic form of governance provides the necessary environment that ensures a stable political regime and enhances aid effectiveness? The key to our line of questioning lies in the understanding that well-institutionalized democracies are more likely to produce, over the long run, effective, efficient and sustainable economic and social policies. Isham, Kaufman, and Pritchett (1995) find that effective citizen voice and public accountability often leads to greater efficacy in government action and a more efficient allocation of resources. To extend that analysis in the case of aid would mean a substantial fraction of the aid amount received by a country actually reaches the poor. The quality of democratic institutions is also believed to affect the effectiveness of aid by providing accountability mechanisms in the management of external resources. Monitoring of aid money spending and impact evaluation should thus be stringently undertaken by the aid giving organizations, as also by the recipient government. In case the latter does not have a strong and transparent monitoring and evaluation system in place, part of the aid money should be strategically devoted to build such institutional capabilities. Svensson (1999) finds that "in the long-run growth impact of aid is conditional on the degree of political and civil liberties in the recipient country. Aid has a positive impact on growth in countries with institutionalized and well-functioning checks on governmental power." Kosack (2003) finds that aid is effective in democracies in its ability to improve the quality of life but ineffective in autocracies. Hodler (2007) suggests that the absence of democratic checks and balances on ruling elites should be blamed for the absence of beneficial effects of foreign aid on economic growth and development. However, in a most recent paper Bjornskov and Schröder (2010) finds that foreign aid leads to a more skewed income distribution in democratic developing countries, while such effects are not present in autocratic countries. Hence, the role of democratic governance on the effectiveness of foreign aid still remains opaque. Present authors intend to extend this line of research further in future with alternative measures of political stability, and using more micro-level data. 
